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LABOR LAW IN MISSOURI*
AUSTIN F. SHUTE**
It is difficult to recognize any distinctive trends in the field of labor
law in Missouri during the past year. The cases handed down were merely
a continuation of pre-existing law, although the confusion created by the
"pre-emption" cases1 was carried one step further in the case of Uwited Brick
& Tile v. Wilkinson.2 This case involved peaceful picketing of United Brick's
plant after the picketing union had been rejected by the employees in a
National Labor Relations Board representation election. The majority of
the company's employees were already represented by District No. 50 of
the United Mine Workers. The picketing was enjoined by the trial court,
the company alleging that it had suffered considerable damage from the
picketing. Neither the company nor the union had attempted to seek relief
from the National Labor Relations Board after the representation election,
but both sides stipulated that interstate commerce was involved.3
The appellate court recognized that the primary purpose of the picket-
ing by the appellant union was to force and coerce both the employer and
the employees to accept it. This coercion type of picketing has traditionally
been restrained by Missouri courts on the basis that it violates the freedom
of choice guaranteed to employees by the Missouri Constitution., But here
the appellate court "rather reluctantly" agreed with the appellant union's
contention that Congress had pre-empted the field and delegated exclusive
jurisdiction to the NLRB.
The court reviewed the various federal cases holding that Congress had
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1959 and 1960 Missouri court
decisions.
**Attorney, Kansas City; A.B., University of Missouri, 1950, LL.B., 1952.
1. See Guss v. Utah Labor Re]. Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955);
Graybar Elec. Co. v. Automotive Union, 365 Mo. 753, 287 S.W.2d 794 (1956) (en
bane); Jack Cooper Trans. Co. v. Stufflebeam, 365 Mo. 250, 280 S.W.2d 832 (1955)
(en bane).
2. 325 S.W.2d 50 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
3. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1952).
4. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 29; Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957);
Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492 (1955) (en bane);
Tallman Co. v. Latal, 365 Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547 (1955) (en bane).
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
pre-empted the field. The case of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
inon5 was noted, with the court quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter as holding:
(1) State courts may enjoin and grant compensation for conduct
marked by violence and imminent threat to the public order. (2)
State courts may neither enjoin nor grant compensation if the con-
duct is either prohibited or protected by the Act; (a) This is so
even though the Board refuses to accept jurisdiction; (b) This is so
if the conduct is 'fairly debatable' as either protected or prohibited.
(3) The majority opinion holds or at least strongly intimates (and
four justices so construed it) that state courts are powerless to act,
even though the activities are 'neither protected nor prohibited.'
Thus, it would seem that peaceful picketing is withdrawn from the scope
of state action under the particular circumstances of this case, even though
it is coercive picketing, and even though a great deal of .damage might be
sustained by the picketed company. It is possible that either the company
or the certified union might have obtained relief through Board action. It
is equally possible that they might not have obtained relief through Board
action. In any event, it is questionable whether this type of activity on the
part of any labor union is desirable or necessary. Since it is becoming in-
creasingly difficult to get any type of labor legislation through Congress, it
would appear that the federal courts are going to have to spell out with
greater clarity exactly what the state courts can and cannot do in this field,
and that the federal courts furthermore may be forced by necessity to en-
large their own jurisdiction.
City of Joplin v. Industrial Commr'n involved a proceeding under the
Prevailing Wage Act.8 By virtue of this Act, the Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations for the State of Missouri is authorized to ascertain pre-
vailing hourly rates of wages for various crafts and types of workmen. The
Industrial Commission made certain findings, which were set aside upon
appeal to the circuit court. All the parties appealed from the circuit court's
ruling.
The Act applies to work done for public bodies and public works. Vari-
ous aspects of the law were considered, including its constitutionality, but
the principal effect of this case on the developing theories of labor relations
in the State of Missouri is found in the court's recognition that wage rates
vary throughout the state and that the wage rates found by the Commission
5. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
6. 325 S.W.2d 50, 55 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
7. 329 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
8. §§ 290.210, .310, RSMo 1957 Supp.
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2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/3
LABOR LAW IN MISSOURI
were not the prevailing wage rates for similar work existing in the City of
Joplin or Jasper County. In other words, the court felt that the Commission
had overlooked the fact that the wage rates generally paid in the vicinity
concerned should have been taken into consideration.
Miller v. Kansas City Power & Light CoY involved an action by em-
ployees for specific performance of the seniority provisions of their collective
bargaining agreement. The background of the case involved a member of
the bargaining unit who had been promoted out of the bargaining unit, and,
several years later, was returned to the same unit. Under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, a promoted employee would receive no
seniority credit for the period he was outside of the bargaining unit. In this
case, the promoted employee bumped a member of the bargaining unit who
had greater seniority at the time the promoted employee reentered the unit.
Although the defendant company alleged that the state court had no
jurisdiction over the case, due to the fact that the action complained of
amounted to an unfair labor practice, 10 the court did not agree. Citing from
the case of McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,"-
the court stated:
Conduct that constitutes a breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is not for that reason alone an unfair labor practice. Proposals
to make breach of contract an unfair labor practice were before
Congress when it enacted the Taft-Hartley law, but were spe-
cifically rejected by the conference committee on the ground that
once the parties had entered into [an] ... agreement, enforcement
should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
Going into the more important question of whether or not specific per-
formance of the collective bargaining agreement would be ordered, the court
held that a court of equity had no such power. There is little question but
what the court is correct in its statements that there are no cases directly
in point on this particular question. The court referred to the case of McAmnis
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. 12 and stated that it was not applicable.
That case involved a refusal by Panhandle Easterfn to reinstate a discharged
employee after the Arbitration Board called under the contract ordered his
reinstatement. The relief granted in that case was an order directing the
9. 332 S.W.2d 18 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960).
10. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1952).
11. 49 Cal.2d 45, 53, 315 P.2d 322, 326 (1957).
12. 273 S.W.2d 789 (K.C. Ct. App. 1954).
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company to desist from further disobeying the arbitration decree. On the sur-
face, at least, this would certainly appear to be specific performance of the
arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
The whole theory of collective bargaining agreements is to keep need-
less litigation from the courts. Certainly, if this theory is sound, the court
should be anxious to impose upon the bargaining parties the same obliga-
tions and duties which they have undertaken by virtue of the agreement.
The employee returned into the bargaining unit certainly knew at the time
he accepted his promotion out of the unit that he was no longer entitled to
seniority. He must also have known that in a good many instances, people
going into management are often returned into the bargaining unit. That
being so, there would seem to be little reason why the employee who was
"bumped" should not have been given the relief requested.
Angle v. Owsley' 8 was a habeas corpus proceeding by the president of
the local union who had been cited for contempt by the circuit court for
violation of the anti-picketing provisions of an injunction. The original in-
junction had been issued in 1951. The picketing complained of occurred in
June of 1959; there was no violence in connection with this picketing. There
was no question but that the picketing complained of violated the prohibi-
tion of the injunction, assuming that the injunction was still valid.
At the time of the 1951 picketing, apparently there had been quite a bit
of violence. The court reviewed the case of Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadownoor Dairies,-4 which advanced the theory that where violence was
so enmeshed with the picketing that it would be difficult to separate the law-
ful picketing from the unlawful picketing, all picketing would be enjoined.
This was not found to be the case, however, with the 1959 picketing, and
the court could not conclude that "resumption of picketing seven years later
and by different defendants would likely cause violence to recur so as to
bring this case within the rule declared in the Meadowmoor case."
The court then held that the 1951 injunction was valid only insofar as
it restrained force and violence, and that the petitioner could not have been
guilty of contempt since he had not violated the terms of the injunction as
to force or violence. The rest of the injunction was held invalid under the
pre-emption theories discussed previously.
Kilgore v. Industrial Comin'n1 5 involved the denial by the Industrial
13. 332 S.W.2d 457 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
14. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
15. 337 S.W.2d 91 (Spr. Ct. App. 1960).
[Vol. 25
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Commission of unemployment compensation benefits to a union employee.
The particular employee was a movie projectionist who had been asked by
the regular movie projectionist at a drive-in theater to work for him once a
week. After a number of months, the regular employee decided that he would
return to work full time, and the part-time employee thereupon quit.
The union, through its agent, had authorized the regular projectionist
to return to work seven nights a week. This led to the Commission's finding
that the claimant had left his work voluntarily and without good cause
attributable to his work or to his employer. The decision of the Industrial
Commission was reversed by the circuit court.
The appellate court held that its inquiry into the case would have to be
limited to whether or not the findings of the Commission were supported by
competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record. The findings of
the Commission could not be set aside unless they were clearly contrary to
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The court agreed that every time
an employee leaves his job, it does not necessarily mean that the act is
voluntary:
Extraneous factors and surrounding circumstances must be taken
into account and where pressure of circumstances compels termina-
tion by the employee, then the termination is involuntary.1 6
In this case, however, the court found that the union was actually the
agent of the employee aggrieved, and that the claimant-employee accepted
this by going to work under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
in effect. When the regular projectionist returned to work on a seven-day
basis, the court found that the union, rather than the employer, was re-
sponsible for the withholding of the claimant's services. Thus, the court
found that the Commission's findings were supported by competent and
substantial evidence upon the whole record.
16. Id. at 99.
1960]
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